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Some Advances in Legal Practical Reason: For a Progressive Dialogue with 
Contemporary Hermeneutics 
 
Abstract: This paper intends to critically discuss some points of the contemporary thesis concerning 
constitutional hermeneutics and methodology of law. Once identified some authors and the lines of 
argumentation affiliated grosso modo to the linguistic turn and rhetoric, as well as the core of the 
transcendental powers of communication (v.g. N. MacCormick, R. Alexy, K. Günther), the objective is 
to  identify  some dialogue with  economics  and  political  science, enlightened  by  recent researches 
about Hegel-Marx interpretations of social life. Of course the discussion inevitably passes through 
methodological questions, opposing analytics vs. dialectics, idealistic vs. realists standpoints. In a 
effort to foment the inclusive dialogue between points of view concerning the concept of law that may 
create (not necessarily) radical opponents, the lines of conclusion intents to revisit some foundations 
of Hegelian "method" (so to speak) and intends to give a modest contribution to a more profound 
analysis of the relations between sein and sollen categories, in order to enrich the discussions about 
technology and social life, specially the life of the law nowadays. 
Keywords: hermeneutics, methodology, Hegel, Marx, dialectics, Alexy, Günther, MacCormick 
 
I. Introduction - The linguistic realism and the linguistic turn: subject plus history 
When Ludwig Wittgenstein – who had been one of the supporting theorists for the Vienna 
Circle’s neo-positivism – brought about the “linguistic turn” and rejected the worldview of his 
own Tractatus, philosophers, including those of law, could no longer ignore the constitutive 
aspect of language in the relationship between subject and object of knowledge, then opening 
new possibilities and making new requirements for some epistemic disputes, now under the 
lights of the linguistic paradigm. 
Legal interpretation, specially constitutional hermeneutics, reverberates today much of 
these disputes in philosophy, inclusive in law. Of course, all these concepts are not precise 
when one approaches a particular movement or author, but they are at the basis of key issues 
in contemporary hermeneutics. The very notions of realism and idealism are in the core of 
major differences in philosophy, inclusive in epistemic and legal issues. 
Taking for granted the historical opposition between consciousness and praxis, there are 
important developments in the 20th century with the so called analysis of language, which is 
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generally represented by the turn from analytics to pragmatics in the search of meaning. The 
language was raised from a logical-semantic to a practical and realistic level, highlighting 
subjects in context and historical action. 
Aligned with this new conception of knowledge through action, different contributions to 
legal  reasoning  and  hermeneutics  arose.  On  the  one  hand,  the  dialectical-argumentative 
realisms  (Chaim  Perelman,  Theodor  Viehweg,  Luís  Siches  e.g.)  that  relied  on  linguistic 
concepts to revive the Aristotelian topic-rhetoric model and, accordingly, always conceived 
decisions in a special relation with historical and determined limits (the auditorium, the topoi, 
the values etc.). On the other hand, the linguistic-pragmatic realisms (Klaus Günther, Robert 
Alexy, Neil MacCormick etc.) are present tendencies somehow founded with Hegel’s and 
Marx’s dialectics, with contemporary shelter in linguistic turn of L. Wittgenstein, J. Searle, J. 
L. Austin and in the transcendental foundations of Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. 
This  branch  is  seen  in  the  varied  philosophies  of  praxis  at  odds  with  the  so-called 
philosophies of consciousness and claims to find, amid history and meaningful contexts, 
safer criteria for the practical reason, that is, the truth of the oughts, that is, the right answer. 
Habermas’ theory had major repercussions in legal thinking until the present time, very 
clearly  with  German  writers,  like  Alexy  and  Günther.  Habermas  himself  later  turned  his 
analysis  to  law,  and  between  his  ideas  and  those  of  Alexy  there  are  many  touch  points 
concerning the possibility of correct decision.  
The  purpose  of  the  analysis  herein  is,  therefore,  dedicate  some  lines  to  the  second 
appointed  branch  of  realism  in  jurisprudence,  with  Alexy  chosen  as  an  example  for 
discussion, even though the branch of rhetoric, from Viehweg to Perelman, deserved equal 
treatment. 
Thus the present paper intends to discuss some lines around two important questions:  
1) What are the limits to linguistic meanings that give an approximate but more concrete 
demarcation to the reasons that defines professional interpretation in law?  
2) What is the role of language in determining these limits? In other words: Are there 
non-linguistic levels of reality that influence practical reason? 
 
II. The legal reasoning according to Robert Alexy’s linguistic-pragmatic realism 
The truth, for Alexy, is described as a consensual relationship, a well-established consensus, 
achieved through a rational discourse of rational communication between individuals equally 
rational. The search for consensus is the main condition of possibility for a practical reason.  
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In the case of a normative statement, a moral judgment or a rule of law, for example, we 
then  face  a  practical  discourse.  Alexy  remarks  that  "the  mere  mention  of  the  fact  that 
normative claims are open to discussion is not yet conclusive reason to ensure that they can be 
improved  by  correction  or  justification.  These  discussions  may  be  mere  instruments  to 
persuade, to psychologically influence someone else. The essential question is whether there 
are  rules  or  criteria  to  distinguish  the  good  from  the  bad  reasons,  valid  from  invalid 
arguments”2 
In argumentative justification, the important thing is that there is always possibility of 
additional arguments to support a given thesis. But to relegate the justifiability to progressive 
agreements is too baseless argumentation, without fundaments, an infinite regression. To stop 
such a regression, one can arbitrarily decide and put an end or instead justify the discussion in 
circularity. This is the "Trilemma of Munchausen”, according to Alexy: 
“... it can be avoided by replacing the requirement for a new chain justification by a 
series of conditions which governs the procedure of justification. These conditions can be 
formulated as rules  for  rational  discussion. The rules  of rational  discussion does  not 
relate only to the statements as do the rules of logic, but reach beyond them to govern the 
conduct  of  the  speaker.  In  this  context  they  can  be  called  'pragmatic  rules'.  The 
observation of these rules certainly does not guarantee the certainty of all conclusive 
results, but it certainly sets the results as rational. Rationality, then, should not be treated 
as  conclusive  certainty.  This  characterizes  the  basic  idea  of  the  practical-rational 
discourse theory.”3 
 
Another important  question is  where these rules  come from  and why they would be 
followed. This is another face of the foundation problem, which Alexy aims to solve using 
some  Habermas’  thesis.  It’s  notorious  that,  even  Alexy’s  rules  of  the  “general  practical 
discourse” are derived in some way from Habermas, to whom "the conditions of discourse are 
ideal when 'the communication is not prevented either by external contingent factors or by 
internal restrictions of the very structure of communication". 
That's why this foundation is called "transcendental pragmatic". Alexy explains:  
It is transcendental to the extent that the rules are justified by showing that its validity 
is  a  condition  of  the  possibility  of  linguistic  communication.  And  it’s  pragmatic 
because these are rules of discourse that does not deal exclusively with the syntax or 
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semantics, but go beyond that to regulate the relationship of the speaker with their own 
expressions.4 
 
This  is  the  foundational  path  of  legal  reasoning  in  a  "general  theory  of    practical 
discourse." Law, therefore, would be an institutionalization of the rules of discourse, as a 
guarantor of its application and is not only consequence, but also necessary for the resolution 
of practical issues in order to guarantee the right decision. In fact, if the rules of discourse 
allow, at least approximately, a wise decision, nothing better than to institutionalize them and 
make their enforcement through the law. 
 
III. Some criticism 
Some critics made against the dialectical-argumentative realism (Viehweg, Perelman, etc.) 
can also be made to the linguistic-pragmatic realism of Alexy because, from a dialectical 
point of view, rationality is based on pragmatic rules that are created by subjects in historical 
situation, whose logic is founded on an ontology that is variable, but mainly linguistic. Hence 
other relations between the subjects who speak and tangible reality are considered overcome 
or outdated. 
With respect to the central problems of legal interpretation, Alexy proposes necessary 
(transcendental) rationality even in conflictive circumstances that hardly would allow any 
correct parameter for the response. By rules of practical discourse, the right answer appears at 
least as a regulative idea, a concept which is present in the subjects in dispute, but that could 
only be affirmed as possible through a procedure. 
Therefore some critics to Alexy precisely emphasize his formal rationality, which would 
be an approximation of some models of procedural justification. In this regard, Alexy has 
clearly  stated  that  "there  is  not  indeed  material  moral  theories  that,  for  every  practical 
question, allow a conclusive, intersubjective and safe extraction of a single right answer." 
However, the criticism of his proposals deserve a more detailed appreciation, because within 
the branch called philosophy of praxis there are some clearly identified variants in "internal 
disputes" among its own supporters, with recurring charges of "return" to the philosophy of 
consciousness patterns.  
Hence, a critical appraisal of the various “linguistic legal realisms”, represented here by 
Alexy, may bring about some critique lines of the core of communicative action theory. Let us 
return to some fundamental tenets of Habermas.   
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IV. From Habermas to Honneth. 
Habermas wanders: if modern man became aware of instrumental reason’s effects in terms of 
ideological colonization of the “lifeworld”, may the revealing criticism of this abuse finally be 
provided within the historical contexts? In other words, can reason criticize itself, backed in a 
dimension of praxis that performs its own rationality? Habermas says no, presupposing a 
transcendental imperative of communication that gives a universal content to practical reason 
from outside of the varying contexts in the different forms of culture. By contrast, Hans G. 
Gadamer,  in  the  light  of  the  thought  of  Martin  Heidegger  says  yes,  because  the  very 
understanding of the existential world already carries the critical emancipatory potential as 
long as  it builds  the “being” upon hermeneutic action which cannot  leave intersubjective 
contexts of communication.  
For  this  reason,  Habermas  —  and  his  search  for  a  universal,  eternal,  non-historical 
criterion to judge facts ultimately by means of a transcendentalism that returns to the Kantian 
tradition — resumed the “unfinished project of modernity" and was accused of return to the 
Enlightenment’s dimension and limits, to the philosophy of consciousness which he sought to 
overcome. 
In briefest outline, this controversy is an example that shows the vivid tension between 
idealism and realism today, it’s still a dispute between consciousness and history, and here is 
more controversial than we can solve on a simple synthesis. 
At this point it is interesting that, following the tradition of Frankfurt, Axel Honneth 
draws  attention  to  the  need  to  combine  an  axiological  point  of  view  inherent  to  social 
struggles that underlie the meanings assumed by a community and, as such, are previous or at 
least concurrent to emancipatory communicative reason possibilities. It is an attempt to return 
to Hegel and Marx from the point of view of the primacy of the conflict as a source of ethical 
meaning. 
Honneth  —  a  philosopher  trained  in  the  tradition  of  the  Frankfurt  School  —  was 
Habermas’ assistant and now is director of the Institute for Social Research at the University 
of Frankfurt. He raised some critiques of the model of communicative reason to consider that 
consensus is one of the forms of social emancipation that has support in the morality inherent 
to the social struggle, in its various forms. This means that Habermas’ proposal for a universal 
emancipation  with  the  theory  of  communicative  action  —  which  is  founded  in  a 
transcendental  necessity  of  recognition  of  the  various  spheres  of  human  search  for 
understanding — neglected important aspects of the investigation of the concrete foundations 
of rationality.   
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To  Honneth,  Habermas’  proposal  contains  ambiguities,  especially  in  the  distinction 
between lifeworld and instrumental rationality of the dominant system, because his historical 
explanation  of  social  evolution  —  in  regard  to  criticize  the  mechanism  of  historical 
materialism and of the theory of systems — is itself somewhat mechanical. But it should be 
noted  that  these  ambiguities  do  not  allow  to  see  clearly  the  extent  to  which  "lifeworld" 
rationality enters the one of the "system",  so that the assumption of a communicative action 
that  enables  the  emancipation  seems  a  simplistic  answer,  in  Honneth’s  view,  which  is 
concerned with the most radical and concrete causes of the instrumental rationality itself. 
Thus, Honneth proposes a kind of anti-idealist turn against Habermas, because if there 
are inevitable elements that allow the consensus and understanding in the world, which allow 
to comprehend morality, they are the various forms of social struggle that, in a contradictory 
reality, permit to clarify the emancipatory potential of "classes", violated in their aspirations 
for recognition of rights. 5 
Nevertheless, this essay seeks to investigate some contribution to the understanding of 
the  hermeneutical  senses  in  more  concrete  and  more  realistic  bases,  as  a  contribution  to 
constitutional hermeneutics or as a critical point of view of some contemporary theories of 
rhetorical-argumentative or linguistic-pragmatic inheritance, or even of those theories which 
assumes the right answer in practical reason. The relationship between social conflict and 
morality — whether in the sphere of labor through a remaining notion of class struggle today, 
or in other contradictory spheres —  is a open question that requires, even today, a lot of 
research. 
Supported  by  some  readings  like  this  one  performed  by  Honneth,  it’s  necessary  to 
investigate more deeply and directly the realistic foundations of concrete dialectic arguments, 
at  the  core  of  Hegelian-Marxist  methodological  matrix,  in  search  of  their  main  keys  to 
comprehend the legal phenomenon nowadays.  
Therefore, it is necessary to revisit the epistemological roots in the philosophy of praxis. 
May Hegel and Marx reveal unexplored grounds for a critical practical reason, even at a 
historical moment in which many theorists insist to call post-Marxist or post-modern? If the 
answer is affirmative, these theories may sum up a hard attack to the core of communicative 
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action, with negative effects to the legal thinking theories based on this point, specially those 
which defend a procedural working instead of a material investigation. 
 
V. Hegel, Marx and dialectics revisited 
In effort to discuss some theoretical elements of Hegel and Marx’s dialectics, shall we quote 
some  interesting  arguments  from  Brazil,  specially  from  Jorge  Grespan,  professor  of 
department of history in University of São Paulo. 
According to Grespan, Marx died before writing about the translation of the Hegelian 
method, which was, as he said, "upside down". However, Marxist dialectics has structural 
differences in comparison to the Hegelian one, deep categorical differences, which is well 
explained in this "inversion of dialectics". First, the "inversion" was described by the German 
verb "umstülpen" that would be better translated as "to turn inside out", as when one reverses 
a glove from inside or roll up the sleeves of a shirt. 
This inversion is given to the concepts of determinations of reflection in Hegelian logic, 
and  through  dialectical  articulation  between  identity  and  difference.  Differences  between 
members of civil society would be merely partial and external, because the State  —  the 
fulfillment of reason  —  has the function to give cohesion to these differences, making them 
an identity as a totality. In Marx, this logic is turned inside out. In the words of Grespan: 
That is, returning to the metaphor of the glove turned inside out: the difference in Hegel 
was outside and identity on the inside. If, for Hegel, identity is the prevailing "moment" 
in determination of the difference, for Marx, "conversely", the difference is what prevails 
over the identity and determines it, more than is determined. In other words, both logical 
figures determine one another, as required by the dialectic; but idealism says, on the 
contrary, that the identity is the greater whole, covering the difference and solving it; 
while  materialism  thinks,  if  not  the  preponderance  of  difference,  at  least  that  this 
difference is irreducible to any identical-and-conciliatory-unit. Hegel would have had the 
merit to "discover" this mutual determination of identity and difference, which is the very 
contradiction; but he "then mystified" this logical relationship, as far as he stated that the 
identity prevails to form a world as unity, while its diversity and conflict were only 
apparent. 6 
 
This distinction between this two forms of dialectics shows that Marx's materialist thesis 
sees  the  difference,  the  conflict  and  the  contradiction  as  essential,  while  the  idealistic 
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Hegelian thesis sees the difference as external, purporting that reality organize itself through 
reason  and  that  identity  is  what  matters,  in  a  manner  the  State  can  overcome  the 
contradictions by its ability to merge the differences. 
Secondly,  still  according  to  Grespan’s  analysis,  the  overcoming  thesis,  in  terms  of 
primacy of the identity or the difference, turns out very different in Hegel and Marx, since the 
very notion of contradiction is different in the two authors. So that, in Hegelian dialectics, 
there is the contradiction between two opposing terms, understood the positive and negative. 
Something is dialectically alive provided that is founded on the overcoming of self-denial, 
which is a necessary moment. This notion of contradiction in which a term is founded on the 
basis of the denial of its opposite is an implication that Grespan describes as a "sinking into 
contradiction": 
This "sink in contradiction" is, however, a defined logical category. In opposition, the 
positive and the negative refer to one another, and so each one includes the other as part 
of his other self. On the other hand, neither lowers itself to be simple part from the other, 
each one can be defined as something, a whole. [...] That is, if on the positive side the 
negative is only one moment that must be noted, therefore this negative could not be 
itself a whole from which positive would be a simple component. To set itself up as 
something    necessarily  entire    positive  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  moment  of  its 
opposite definition. Hence it refuses to the opposite this status of totality claimed for 
itself. And the same goes vice versa for the other. Thus, the opposition of two terms is 
presented  as  the  opposition  between  mutual  inclusion  and  mutual  exclusion,  which 
guides their relationship.7 
 
Based on this notion we may understand why the contradiction between capital and labor 
asserted by Marx’s dialectical logic is not of the same kind, because the dominance of capital 
over labor means that only capital can be understood as a totality that "sinks into its negation", 
that is labor, so that capital recognizes labor as its "moment", but denies it to self-maintaining: 
In other words, at the same time that capital must include labor force in itself as its 
variable moment, to increase and be defined as capital, it also has to exclude labor as 
possible  totality,  because  if  this  were  the  case,  labor  would  not  produce  to  it,  and 
therefore, there would be no longer capital. 8 
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Labor has not the ability to submit capital as one of its moments, then, through this 
denial, overcome itself as a totality and this is an impossibility derived from a concrete 
logic, in contrast to what could be conceived formally, in a Hegelian way, in a conceptual 
linkage between capital and labor, at the end overcome by the spirit. 
Based on these ideas, the Marxist inversion occurs in three conceptually related theses:  
(1)   the dialectics is seen with support in the contradictions of reality. The logic is 
put upside down to search its roots in the concrete point of capital’s tendency to annihilate 
labor;  
(2)   That’s  why  the  philosophy  of  history  was  put  on  track  to  conceive  that 
materialistic holders of the productive forces  which are another historical subject nothing 
spiritual    could  now  effectively  change  history  with  conscience:  men,  by  the  action, 
determine and change the world (including the Hegelian state);  
(3)   the  challenge  to  dialectical  method  is  to  confront  the  tension  between  the 
structures of various historical manifestations of these contradictions and the ability of the 
involved subjects to take action and overcome these contradictions, at the best moment for 
that. 
 
These  elements,  moved  to  present  day,  reveals  another  special  point:  that  action  of 
concrete men and their material relationships are not, in the Marxian dialectics, totally 
free. The time of revolution in Marx is indeed a historic moment that requires the suppression 
of labor by capital, in use of its inherent exploitative capacity. So the key points of the various 
Marxisms, which are around the contradiction between capital and labor, become complex if 
brought together the history of the development of capitalism in the twentieth century and the 
collapse of socialist states, among other factors. 
We believe that the root of these problems is that action set in the method generated 
enormous tensions between concept and reality that, if well understood, gave rise to many 
discussions  about  the  viability  of  a  Marxist  philosophy  in  the  twenty-first  century.  The 
critiques  of  Marxism,  in  this  sense,  focused  primarily  on  the  problems  of  precise 
identification of how much action can change the world and to what extent the structured 
world is non-changeable (not in the sense of a static world, but in its moments as a process, 
which contains a rigid concrete structure). But as we will see, this is precisely the richness of 
this possibility of a method. 
If,  for  instance,  the  rejection  of  Marx's  ideas  is  usually  argued  thanks  to  the  fail  in 
categorical representation of the world and because the inability of their political class actions  
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to  actually  change the  world,  we understand that a better comprehension  of a  dialectical 
method  complexity  can  overcome  the  criticism,  which  are  inclusive  necessary  for  the 
description and transformation of the world itself as a becoming. This is the wealth that Marx 
(and  Hegel)  bequeathed  to  the  philosophy  of  our  days.  Taking  it  for  granted  or  simply 
overcome is a poor decree of end of the history and critical thinking. 
 
VI. Concrete dialectical method and objectivity  
Before we face the proper questions about law, what to say, nowadays, about a dialectical 
method? 
Much  of  the  criticism  of  a  Marxist  method  of  “understanding”  the  world  can  be 
organized in the following arguments:  
1) there were faults on detailed analysis of the contradictory relations between capital and 
labor  considering  that  capitalist  system  in  the  twentieth  century,  creatively,  acquired 
complexities and ways of maintenance that disproved the diagnoses of both Marx cyclical 
crises of capital and the progressive falling rate of profit that leads to permanent structural 
crisis,  
2) the theory of value based on the labor force, which is the basis of surplus value and 
class conflict, would not apply in monopolist capitalism, dominated by a different notion of 
profit based on a determination of value by financial capital or unproductive labor,  
3) the consciousness of the proletariat as a result of praxis would not have been effective 
and, historically, the political action of working class has chosen the paths of institutional 
action, by way of political parties, not through revolution, and then it was co-opted by the 
system of capital and emptied its role as a historical subject par excellence,  
4) concrete praxis would have failed as a descriptive, ethical, and emancipatory proposal, 
not only because of what the Soviet empire has become, but also thanks to the increasing 
strength of State with the fall of the USSR,  
5)  the  centrality  of  labor  to  dialectical  thinking  would  not  offer  shelter  to  the 
emancipation of man once the overwhelming face of capitalist domination is a negative and 
progressive source of inequality: then justice, for Marx, beeing something to come in the 
future post-capitalist, would exhaust the ethical alternatives in the present moment, which he 
called pre-history of all mankind. 
The  central  point  is,  therefore,  the  tension  between  structure  and  human  capacity  to 
change this structure and the scientific results of theoretical approaches.  
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We note that in principle all the criticism could not be sustained based on categories of 
representation, typical of the philosophy of consciousness, but in light of categories of action 
and dialectics.  
Analyzing  the  concept  of  Marx’s  dialectics  with  the  intention  to  clarify  alleged 
theoretical misunderstandings internal to Marxism itself, the czech philosopher Karel Kosik 
defended a thesis that seems quite convincing on the subject of what interests us here, a 
dialectical method as a process of knowledge and action. Any errors of men, accordingly, 
should not put an end to what Marx himself did not propose as such a closed and final system: 
To the extent that Marxism did not apply the Marxist dialectic to its own theory and 
practice, this omission has produced at least two important consequences.  
First,  this  omission  meant  a  fertile  ground  in  which  could  appear  periodically  and 
alternatively, (a) the revolutionary thesis, which believes that revolution will solve all the 
contradictions  of  human  reality,  (b)  revolutionary  and  post-revolutionary  skepticism, 
which believes that revolution cannot solve any of these contradictions.  
Second, Marxism lost a great opportunity to develop one of the primary problems of 
dialectics, in which Hegel failed and that is of main importance to the moral act. I think 
particularly of the problem of the end of the history, or to express it in other terminology, 
the meaning of history. 
To Marx, materialist dialectics was an instrument used to report and describe in a critical 
way the contradictions of capitalist society. But when Marxists come to take their own 
practice and theory, they confuse materialism and idealism, dialectics and metaphysics, 
critical and apologetics. In this sense, we must conceive the fidelity to Marx as a return to 
consequent reasoning and to the application of materialist dialectics to all phenomena of 
contemporary society, including Marxism and socialism themselves. In the same vein, 
we  must  also  formulate  the  question  why  there  is  a  tendency  for  apologetics, 
metaphysics, idealism.
 9 
 
From the perspective of action (praxis), a transition is possible, not as a denial of any 
representation of reality at all. What Marx provided, at this point, was a twirling in method to 
avoid the monological dimension of mere positivism.  
The  problem  in  this  respect  is  that  there  is  always  the  risk  of  adjustments  of  the 
description of the world from a dialectical point of view, because the relationship between 
development of concrete structures and men power of transform these structures is the main 
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puzzle that Marx proposed to solve. In this sense there are not exactly errors, unless one take 
it as a decision to stop.  
Let  us  see  some  elements  about  the  foundation  in  dialectical  method  to  better 
comprehend this methodological matter. 
 
VII. The truth and real contradiction 
To endorse this thesis with another contribution of Brazilian literature, it’s possible to say 
that, conceptually, dialectics does not admit a foundation in the classical sense, at the same 
time it has to found its principles in a problematic sense. Let us read the interpretation of Ruy 
Fausto, professor of University of São Paulo: 
Dialectics  was  born  as  the  discourse  that  suppresses  the  foundation  (first  one).  This 
suppression  (Aufhebung),  inserted  in  a  totalizing  scheme,  is  presented  as  a  kind  of 
"suspension" of the founding act which waits for the passing of time (the "prehistory" 
time). It is necessary that time flows so that we can proceed to the foundation. Thus, the 
act of founding is somehow "put in brackets", "put out of circuit" in benefit of time 
course. So this “Aufhebung”   renamed “Ausschaltung” for the sake of comparison   
associated with time allows rich comparison between the dialectics and understanding 
discourse. 
Indeed, considering the idea that this relation with time is also a relation to the "world" 
we are allowed to say that if the discourses of understanding (transcendental philosophy 
in particular), put the world (and time) in brackets to perform the founding act, on the 
contrary  dialectics  puts  the  founding  act  in  brackets  to  theoretically  and  practically 
possess the world.
10 
 
At this point it is important to note how the research of dialectical problems of capitalism 
in the effort to unfold Marx’ ideas has been perpetuated. It only makes sense to face reality 
and  its  contradictions  appreciating  the  historical  facts  of  the  development  of  society. 
Advanced capitalism brought interesting challenges to Marxist theory of labor-value and also 
for the very identification of the various facets of capital (especially with the dynamic markets 
in which the new powers of speculative capital are evident). 
But  the  same  advanced  capitalism  seems  to  confirm  many  dialectical  contradictions 
based in social life, specially bound with the core of material production. One of the loudest 
voices of this claim is Hungarian philosopher István Mészáros, to whom the various forms of 
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contradiction are noticed in every part of the world, by the way of national and international 
crisis of the States or in other sectors, for instance, the contradiction between: 
(1)  production and its control; 
(2)  production and consumption;  
(3)  production and circulation; 
(4)  competition and monopoly;  
(5)  development and underdevelopment (…);  
(6)  capital’s structural domination of labor and its insurmountable dependence on 
living labor;  
(7)  authoritarian decision making in the productive enterprises and the need for 
their “consensual implementation” 
(8)  the expansion of employment and the generation of unemployment;  
(9)  growth of output at all costs and the concomitant environmental destruction.
11 
 
Among  others,  these  remarks  are  all  grounded  inevitably  in  the  capital -labor 
contradiction, hereafter understood as a foundation of class struggle in a dialectical sense (cf. 
supra). 
For  that  reason,  there  are  new  interpretations  about  “real”  contradictions  beyond  the 
original idea of capital and labor. Presently the dialectical research seems to have assumed an 
environmental point of view, that is: human action (so labor) must no longer be conceived 
ignoring the natural resources and the limitations of raw materials, even oxygen and water. 
Whether this is autonomous or dependent to the contradiction between capital and labor is 
also an open question. 
Portuguese  professor  Boaventura  de  Sousa  Santos,  although  criticizes  Marxism,  is 
positioned on this matter: 
Inspired by James O'Connor and Karl Polanyi, I believe that capitalism is constituted, not 
by  one  but  two  contradictions.  The  first  contradiction,  formulated  by  Marx,  and 
symbolized in the rate of exploitation, expresses the social and political power of capital 
over labor and also the tendency of capital to the crises of over-production. The second 
contradiction involves the so-called production conditions, that is, everything is treated 
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Monthly Review Press. 2001,  pp.13-14  
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as a commodity despite not having been produced as a commodity, for example, nature.
 
12 
 
But, as we have seen, a dialectical method is acceptable only in terms of a dependent 
relationship with reality. That was and is presently the point of the critical theory of the 
Frankfurt  School.  Originally,  the  theories  of  Theodor  Adorno  and  Max  Horkheimer 
denounced the real contradictions of instrumental reason era, through a dialectical method. 
After their disengagement from Marx’s material aspects, Habermas and Honneth followed the 
dialectics path even though the material contradictions (of production and of ecological limits, 
at minimum) have been no longer re-examined, redefined, criticized, with a theoretical risk of 
abstraction. 
Jurisprudence and, thus, hermeneutics, if conceived regardless of concrete factors, are 
also in danger of becoming abstract or, what is the same, a theoretical mystification. 
 
VIII. Conclusion: dialectic, contradiction, ethics and legal standards 
Given these considerations about a method based on real contradictions, it’s necessary to 
discover their relationship with the formation of values and legal senses, then note the limits 
reality imposes on law interpretation around the “reasonable” idea. What are, therefore, 
the  grounds  of  values,  directions,  wills  and  legal  reasoning  according  to  a  dialectics  of 
concrete? 
The central thesis is: The category of capital has assumed an overwhelming and global 
position and thus has enormous influence on how people view the world and, ultimately, 
limits the socio-cultural elements, including the critical thinking that constitutes noble efforts 
to contain the destructive pressure of profit. 
This thesis has led to strong arguments against Marx, specially about the emptiness of the 
ethics in confront of compelling structures of reality. As to Marx capital would be seen as an 
absolute subject, of an absolute history, which finds a totalizing answer and dictates the rules 
for all spheres of life, of whose "colonization" there is no escape, he was accused of focusing 
contradiction  in  every  action  and  productive  material  work,  with  a  “social  being” 
teleologically determined solely by reproduction. This criticism came from the later theories 
of Adorno and Horkheimer and is among the many criticisms of Habermas. 
So  what  would  remain  of  a  dialectical  theory  with  no  offers  concerning  the  very 
possibilities of ethics, oughts, law and interpretation? 
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The approach must, then, investigate the concept of “social being” to Marx, as a point of 
departure.  It’s  known  he  had  not  a  purely  economical  concept  of  it.  The  “social  being” 
includes dialectical relations among all aspirations of consciousness and concrete needs. Marx 
did not fail to face the issue from the standpoint of material dialectics. What matters here is 
that  every  moral  action,  any  telos,  the  entire  emancipation  of  consciousness  that  may  be 
Marx's “social been” are not determined by the material productive labor, but limited by it. In 
this regard, the concrete dialectics has a negative proposal, in the sense of a minimum point of 
departure to identify the bounds for any action in our globalized world. 
Hence the following questions: Are concrete contradictions of Marx "totalizing" in the 
sense  denounced  by  Habermas?  And  is  a  theory  about  justice  and  about  the  limits  of 
meanings possible within the capitalist mode of production?  
The answer is of course problematic:  
No, while the possible meanings of language have its effectiveness, ultimately, limited 
by the contexts of actual reproduction of societies, dominated by the increasingly conflictive 
logic of wealth accumulation. At this point, justice as universal equality and dignity would be 
far from desirable and very near to unicorns. 
Yes, to the extent that this limitation of “ought” comes from the “real being” at present 
societies,  which  are  all  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  under  the  influence  of  the  capitalist 
regime, although this “being” is in fact daily changed by the uncountable forms of praxis, 
inclusive the simple faith in ethics. The humanization of man and of his work (and therefore 
of all spheres of life), according to Marx, is an ethical proposition per se, idealistic in the 
sense that it confronts the real, and non-idealistic as far as it searches (or have the potential to 
search) for the very concrete grounds of our existence. 
Thus the major legal problems or so called “emancipatory” issues of humanity, such as 
the environmental rights, human rights, women's rights, child protection, the ethnic tolerance 
and so on cannot simply be thought realistically, that is, in terms of its full effectiveness, 
without a comprehensive approach of the obstacles and the various faces of the perverse logic 
of a destructive regime.  
That’s  why  the  ideas  of  Axel  Honneth  are  interesting  for  claiming  a  return  to  the 
conflictive dimension as the basis of ethics. It shows a special interest in material conflicts 
and refuses the “end of history” thesis. Given historical impossibility of class consciousness 
in  the nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries  and the perverse increase of the exploitation  of 
mankind, there are very open questions to think about.  
16 
Hence, a deeper understanding of the theories of argumentation and hermeneutics based 
on consensus requires a stronger rediscover of the philosophies of Hegel and Marx. The limits 
of the linguistic senses to economics, labor and nature, far from determinism, are a reality that 
calls  for  further  investigation,  much  further  than  many  external  analysis  like  Law  and 
Economics purports.  
The  glaring  example  of  the  financial  crisis  of  2009,  when  the  U.S.  Congress  voted 
against the bailout package to Wall Street and, days later, was forced to revise the decision 
shows easily how there may be concrete limits to the definitions, hence to practical reason, 
beyond the procedures and guarantees of the transcendental dialogue. 
Jurists may think about balances and proportionality, about the grounds of human rights, 
about the ethical and political justification of equality and freedom, but must do it without the 
naïve belief that the social democracy and rules of participation form a strong bastion against 
the devastating powers of capital. Take for instance the migration problem in the advanced 
democracies: there’s something to do with intolerance, and thus with the right of equality, and 
there’s much more to do with capitalism production and concrete social relations. May  I 
wander: Of course my respect to others depends ultimately on my effective sense of dignity, 
which is based on my profession, on my relation with nature and on my health, guaranteed by 
clean water and pure air. 
Then,  Alexy’s  tenets  about  rationality  in  law  seems  to  face  history,  but  lacks  more 
concrete  approaches,  so  to  take  more  sincerely  the  dialectical  powers.  Otherwise,  the 
hermeneutics of legal reasoning keeps rounding a method that, after all, stresses the linguistic 
barriers to interact with reality, and fails to continue a concrete-based search of meanings, 
performing only allegedly an overcome of the Cartesian model of consciousness. 
The various linguistic and pragmatic legal realisms — which rest on the pragmatics of 
senses or on the need of transcendental consensus — are important as far as they present the 
questions of language as a new labyrinth of Daedalus, in which the substantial conditions for 
a rational practice of changing, included here the law, fall under the limits set by the maze, 
from which one cannot leave without the charge of irrationality. This labyrinth is nothing but 
the Wittgenstein's discovery of the limits of world because of language.  
The  assumption  here  is  that  there  should  be  fundamental  structures  in  a  non-strictly 
linguistic  reality,  which  support  the  consensus  and  possible  directions,  allowing  an 
ontological primacy in a dialectical sense. The various concrete manifestations of the social, 
economic, cultural, political and legal being may be analyzed with a more comprehensive 
form of objectivity, which throws light on the real role of legal rationality, understood either  
17 
as consensus or as a conflict. It’s inside Wittgenstein's linguistic labyrinth — even purporting 
to be a reality in which we operate — that we can think of our history, the soil where it was 
built, the reasons why we are inside and what is possible to think about what's out there. 
The "mystery" that a concrete dialectics should investigate is about the dimensions of 
conflictive  and  concrete  reality,  beyond  the  limits  of  language,  even  though  reasons  and 
actions pass through language and search for consensus day after day. 
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